4 March 2025

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​Mustafa Niyazi​​​

MPhil International Relations

Founder & Chief Editor of Cyprus Profile

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​Turkish Reaction to President Johnson's Letter to Prime Minister Inonu (Redacted). Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). ​​​

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On 4 April, emboldened by all the exception and power bestowed upon it by the United Nations (UN), as well as the protection the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) essentially provided against any external military intervention, especially from Türkiye, and after already having subdued the British forces and taken them into its thrall via the UNFICYP monolith, but failing to do the same to the Turkish forces, the Greek Cypriot administration illegally occupying the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) government then moved to subdue or cripple the Turkish threat through other means and in different non-physical avenues.

 

It contended the Turkish move to leave it's camp following the Greek assaults and deploy in tactical positions astride the Girne (Kyrenia) road north of Lefkoşa (Nicosia), and unilaterally abrogated the 1960 Treaty of Alliance.

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Though this had little effect in actually making the Turkish contingent leave, it gave the Makarios regime more avenues through which to attack and contain the threat of a potential Turkish intervention.

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The UN was having the intended effect.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

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Months of relentless and shrieking assaults against the Turkish Cypriots followed, completely unabated, with the UN doing little beyond just observing, or providing belated after-the-fact aid, slave to the caloric restrictions imposed by the Makarios government.

 

The UN oftentimes found itself reacting most discernably through diplomatically worded "protests" and "complaints", such as when General Gyani protested the Greek attacks, while doing nothing to actually intervene and pressurise the Makarios regime to actually stop, or when UN Secretary General U Thant gave orders to the UNFICYP to "take more vigorous action to stop them", but just like Gyani, he did absolutely nothing to make that happen.

 

Attack after attack, assault after assault, massacre after massacre, the Greek Cypriots continued their genocide under the inerted watch of the UNFICYP.

 

One day, soaked deep in their euphoric impunity, their gambles seemed to pay off again when on 11 May they launched a vicious assault on Mağusa (Famagusta) kidnapping and shooting dead 32 Turkish Cypriots.

 

Only by this time the Cyprus Problem had already become too much of an existential threat for Türkiye to bare, and imperiled the very fabric of peace and stability in the region and the delicate balance of relations within the NATO itself.

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The Turkish government responded as it had always done, but this time, it also made the pivotal decision to make preparations for an amphibious landing on the island.

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Alarmed by this self-imposed escalation, on 1 June, Makarios hastily passed an unconstitutional law allowing for the restructuring of the National Guard, in an attempt to "ready" his forces so they could meet a perceived Turkish intervention head on, and two days later, on 3 June, the Turkish government advanced its plans to conduct an intervention, which was being readied for departure on 5-6 June. Türkiye also flew warplanes over the island in reconnaissance to prepare for the battle to come.

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The events triggered a military alert in Greece, which was also preparing to intervene on the side of Makarios, and this joined wider fears that were circulating of potential Soviet involvement, also on the side of Makarios.

 

The two NATO allies were on the cusp of all out war.

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By the evening of that day, troops and vessels gathered near the port of Iskenderun. Ships began to be filled with soldiers and materials at Mersin Port. Then on the morning of 5 June, the ships carrying soldiers set off from Mersin Port under the protection of the Turkish Fleet. ​​

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What happened next would shock everybody.

 

Provoked by incessant Greek lobbying on the White House, and amidst strong fears of potential Greek or Soviet interventions in support of Makarios, as well as the legal obligations binding the NATO alliance to respond to such a threat from the latter, but more crucially a potential war between Greece and Türkiye at the heart of everything, which would further weaken the NATO alliance, the US President, Lyndon B. Johnson, in a blunt and rather undiplomatic letter to İnönü, warned the Turkish government not to intervene in Cyprus.

 

The immediate effect of this letter was to convince İnönü to halt the fleet's advance.

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In that letter, Johnson demanded the Turks "consult fully in advance... with the United States before any such action is taken", and claimed it is not "permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960", even though it was.

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He also revealed the influence, accusations and claims of the Greek lobbyists when he disclosed his "understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of effecting a form of partition of the island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee," and that this treaty "requires consultation among the Guarantor Powers," despite the unilateral efforts of the Greeks to set aside the Cyprus Republic's Constitution and freely-contracted international treaties.

 

Johnson essentially intended, in support of Greece, to deter Türkiye from conducting a military operation in Cyprus in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee which designated Türkiye, the United Kingdom and Greece as the guarantors of peace in Cyprus.​

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He also asserted that the use of American weapons on the island or troops allocated to NATO would violate bilateral agreements between Washington and Ankara, even though it was clearly entitled to do so according to Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee.​​

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Reminding the Prime Minister of Türkiye, İsmet İnönü, that the US and Türkiye "fought against communism together," he threatened: "I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies."

 

This fundamentally meant that if Türkiye continued with its plans and was met by Soviet action during the operation, NATO, or in reality the US, would not consider such an intervention by the USSR to be against NATO itself, that is, Türkiye would be left alone, even though Türkiye would be legally entitled to call upon NATO to come to its aid in such a situation, it would be decisively abandoned in a snuff move.

 

The letter was met with both "shock and disbelief" in Türkiye, and a CIA cable at the time had even conceded that the letter "... has done more to set back United States Turkish relations than any other single act".

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The US Ambassador to Türkiye, Raymond Hare, also immediately requested through the Foreign Minister of Türkiye, Feridun Cemal Erkin, a meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister.

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On the same day he met with the US Ambassador, who asked him for 24 hours, and at​ 21:00 pm, after attending the Council of Ministers meeting, the Turkish Prime Minister defied the US President, saying: "A new world will be built then, and Turkey takes its place there."

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On 21 June, Johnson held a meeting with İnönü in Washington, where he pressurised the Turkish Prime Minister to instead rely on the existing legal frameworks surrounding the Cyprus Problem, meaning, those established via the UN at the request of the Greek Cypriot regime.

 

The government of Türkiye was thus successfully dissuaded from coming to the assistance of the destitute Turkish Cypriot community, and officially announced, with a sense of disappointment, that it had abandoned plans to intervene in Cyprus.

 

The immediate and long-term implications and meanings were clear.

 

The letter became the focus of heightened feelings of isolation in Türkiye, and made it almost mandatory for the country to become more independent of the United States in the field of international relations, eventually forcing it to practice its intervention anyway, after 10 years.

 

Some went so far as to say that even in the light of this letter and the diplomatic flurry of activity which proceeded it, Türkiye should not have postponed the intervention.

 

And although up until that point it can be said that Türkiye was the only country where the Americans were not commonly chastised and told "Yankee Go Home." But after that, the trust of the Turkish public in the US was deeply shattered, and for the first time, a negative public opinion in Türkiye started to form against the US.

 

This negative opinion became more established in the coming years, and led to Türkiye strengthening its resolve to mend its ties with Russia and the Balkan nations.

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This created further divisions among the international community, in particular, and most importantly, it got the great powers involved and divided, managed to turn the Cyprus Problem into a sticking focal point where any intervention would mean very real fears of a wider regional war between the various powers involved, and proved the effectiveness of having the UN present on Cyprus, to allow the same to keep repeating, over and over.

 

Attack after attack, assault after assault, massacre after massacre, the Greek Cypriots continued their genocide under the inerted watch of the UN.

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The threat of a military intervention from Türkiye had also effectively been tamed. 

 

Makarios, through clever diplomatic planning and political chess boarding, most importantly through his cunning manipulation of the UN and its presence on the island, he used the Great Powers to impose strict and binding geopolitical restraints on Türkiye, through which he essentially succeeded in forcing the Turks to just sit back, shut up and watch.

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Until do or die, they could no more.

 

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